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INTRODUCTION
  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National Academy of Science (NAS) in1999
announced the findings of several studies that estimated that medical error results
in 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year. The report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer
Health System, focused considerable attention on oversight of hospital quality. Many
of the responses to the IOM’s report were to either develop a medical-error reporting
system or to find better standards for hospitals and other health care facilities to
uphold. There has been minimal attention paid to the mechanisms of hospital qual-
ity oversight that are currently in place. Accordingly this study will analyze the sys-
tem of hospital quality regulation in the United States.
There are over 6,200 hospitals in the United States. In order to be eligible to
receive payment from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS – for-
merly HCFA), hospitals are required to meet a set of minimum requirements called
Conditions of Participation (CoPs). A private hospital is not required to be eligible for
Medicare and Medicaid in order to exist. It could choose to have every patient pay
out-of-pocket or through private health insurance. However, since over one-third of
U.S. health expenditures are distributed through CMS programs, nearly all hospi-
tals in the U.S. comply voluntarily with the CoPs. If a hospital were determined to be
sufficiently out of compliance it would not be eligible for Medicaid or Medicare funds
and the facility would likely go out of business. If a hospital becomes bankrupt, the
hospital may change ownership to a group that can meet the quality standards of the
CMS. The state or local government may take ownership of the hospital.
The Social Security Act as amended in 1965 gave the JCAHO “deeming” power
for Medicare quality requirements. State certification is needed for Medicaid eligibil-
ity. Currently, 48 states accept JCAHO accreditation as acceptable compliance with
quality assurance requirements for state certification.1 As a result, approximately 80630 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
percent of U.S. hospitals voluntarily use JCAHO’s quality oversight program. Approxi-
mately 1,400 (20%) hospitals use state certification agencies to meet CoPs. State certi-
fication agencies and JCAHO are non-exclusive alternatives for a hospital to meet
Medicare and Medicaid eligibility. A relatively new option for many critical access
hospitals is to be accredited by the American Osteopathic Association (AOA).
Prior to the IOM report, in 1999 the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) berated the JCAHO’s performance
review system and CMS’ oversight of JCAHO. The oversight program was criticized
for being too “collegial” with hospitals, for using a survey process that was unlikely to
identify poor patterns of care, and for generating survey results that do not distin-
guish high and low quality hospitals.2 Because JCAHO is both the primary means of
oversight of and advocacy for the medical industry, it came under heavy scrutiny. In
response, the Commission increased regulatory activity and began unannounced
reinspections of hospitals that had below-standard areas in the Full Survey.
The IOM defines quality as “the degree to which health service for individuals
and populations increase the likelihood of desired outcomes and are consistent with
current professional knowledge.” [Lohr, 1990] The JCAHO inspection evaluates hos-
pitals on adherence to a defined set of professional standards and health care prac-
tice guidelines. Historically, JCAHO did not look at health outcomes in the accredita-
tion decision. Conceptually, suboptimal processes of care raise the probabilities of
non-fatal complications, in-hospital mortality, premature post-discharge deaths and
early re-admissions [Ashton and Wray, 1996]. The objective of this study is to test
whether the information that JCAHO collects during on-site surveys correlates with
the quality of care in hospitals as evidenced by patient outcomes.
There are several studies on the regulation of hospitals with respect to cost con-
tainment [Antel, Ohsfeldt, and Becker, 1995] and there have been recent investiga-
tions on the measurement of hospital quality [McClellan and Staiger, 1999; Geweke,
Gowrisankaran, and Town, 2001]. The role of regulatory effort on hospital quality
has only been minimally studied. One study found that, for acute myocardial infarc-
tion patients, hospitals inspected by JCAHO have higher rates of use for aspirin,
beta-blockers, and reperfusion therapy and lower 30-day mortality than non-JCAHO
accredited hospitals [Chen, Rathore, Radford, and Krumholz, 2003].
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the current U. S.
hospital regulation system. Section 3 presents the theory that motivates the study of
hospital effort and section 4 outlines the specific study questions. The empirical meth-
odology is developed in section 5 and section 6 describes the data that will be used to
address the research questions. Section 7 discusses the findings of the study and
concludes the article.
BACKGROUND: HOSPITAL OVERSIGHT
Historically, JCAHO reviews hospitals every three years on a scheduled basis.
Every hospital is required to have the triennial inspection and each survey is seem-
ingly comparable in intensity. Recently, a 5 percent sample of hospitals has been
randomly inspected with a one-day inspection and the agency has announced that631 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
starting in 2006, all surveys will be unannounced. Random inspections will occur
with the constraint that they must take place every three years.
A team consisting of, at least, a physician, a registered nurse, and a hospital
administrator conducts a “Full Survey” of each participating medical facility. There
are more than 500 performance standards that investigators use to evaluate compli-
ance in order to determine the scores for 46 different performance areas. Because of
the complexity of the inspection requirements, hospitals frequently hire consultants
to prepare for the JCAHO Full Survey.
Each performance area receives a score of 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates full com-
pliance with the standards of that performance area. The minimum acceptable score
for any performance area is a 2. A score of 3, 4, or 5 results in a future re-inspection
of that area. Summaries of the JCAHO inspections are published on the Quality
CheckTM website (http://www.jcaho.org/qualitycheck/directry/directry.asp). Along with
the performance area scores, a Full Survey score, an Updated Survey score, and an
accreditation decision is awarded. The Full Survey is scored on a scale of 0 to 100,
with 100 being the best. Almost every medical facility that JCAHO inspects is awarded
accreditation, but a hospital can be awarded without recommendations (all performance
areas 1 or 2), with recommendations, or conditional (significant need for improvement).
Participation in either JCAHO’s or the AOA’s accreditation programs is volun-
tary. A non-accredited hospital can be certified through state oversight or directly
through CMS. Due to real and potential competition, if one program unilaterally
tries to increase regulatory activity it could result in a shift to an agency that pro-
vides relatively easier compliance. The result is that neither JCAHO nor the AOA
are likely to raise standards because neither wants to lose hospitals from its over-
sight programs.3 Moreover, neither is likely to unilaterally shorten the time between
inspections because that would also increase costs for hospitals. For changes to occur
in the hospital oversight program, the change would need to be directed from the
CMS. If the federal agency mandated tougher rules or stricter penalties for hospital
quality, then the accreditation agencies would be able to enforce the new standards
without losing product share to the other agency or the states.
A final consideration is the nature of the relationship between JCAHO and hos-
pitals. In addition to inspections, JCAHO also acts as a consultant to medical facili-
ties and as an advocate for the health care industry. The majority of the Joint
Commission’s executive board members are from the American Medical Association
or the American Hospital Association. This is an advantage with respect to having
knowledge of the hospital system and the ability to effectively inspect and evaluate
hospital quality; however, it also creates a conflict of interest in JCAHO’s quality
inspections because there may be a tradeoff between higher profits and hospital qual-
ity.
The effectiveness of any strategy of quality regulation depends on whether it can
create enough incentive for the agent to increase effort that improves quality, and
thereby reduce the amounts or intensities of harm. A strategy can fail for several
reasons. First, the standards may be poorly designed so that compliance with those
standards does not improve quality. While this may have some benefit, compliance
will not be realized in terms of lives saved. Second, the regulation may be poorly632 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
enforced. An enforcement problem can result either because the inspection strategy
used by the principal fails to identify deficiencies or low effort, or because the penalty
for low effort is not large enough to prompt a response from the agent. Either way,
compliance with standards would promote quality, but compliance is not incentive-
compatible.
THEORY
The theoretical model borrows heavily from the health demand literature
[Grossman, 1972]. Health is a form of human capital. At any given time, a person has
a stock of health capital and that stock is depreciating. Individuals invest in health
capital through decisions on such things as diet, smoking, exercise, and medical care.
In this view hospitals provide one input into the production of health capital. Illness
is associated with lower health and death occurs when a person’s stock is exhausted.
Patient outcome from a hospital stay is dependent on two sets of factors: health
investments and initial health condition. Investments consist of actions undertaken
by a medical care provider to increase the health stock of its patients. These invest-
ments include observable inputs into health production, such as bed space, nursing
labor, and lab tests, and unobservable inputs, like quality. For the purposes of this
study, it will be assumed that both the observable and unobservable inputs are the
specific results of decisions made by the hospital.
Health conditions of incoming patients are unknown to a hospital prior to arrival
at the hospital. The facility does, however, have information on the distribution of
health conditions and related factors. Hospitals make planning and resource alloca-
tion decisions based on their expectations of the number of patients that demand
care and the health conditions of that population. The quality of care by a hospital
will be explained, in part, by how well the hospital anticipates and schedules for this
demand. With respect to quality, if a hospital’s forecast is low, then it will allocate too
few resources relative to actual need, increasing the risk of poor outcomes. If the
forecast is high then too many resources will be allocated than are actually needed,
creating excess capacity. This would be good for quality but bad for efficiency since
excess capacity is inefficient. Some excess capacity is required by hospitals, which
entails medical personnel and equipment waiting and available in case of an emer-
gent hospital admission.
Of special consideration to health outcomes is medical error. Medical error is a
negative shock to a patient’s health capital stock or a missed opportunity for an invest-
ment. Hospitals incur expenses to identify and prevent medical errors. The effective-
ness of this effort is a facet of the hospital’s quality. The cost of error reduction is
high. Hospitals decide how much effort to expend based on the cost of additional
improvements in error reduction and the benefits of fewer errors. A large benefit to
health care providers is reduced insurance premiums for liability protection. Hospi-
tal effort to improve quality is not directly observable. Hospitals know their levels of
effort, but patients do not. Because quality enhancing effort and excess capacity are
both expensive, hospitals have an incentive to provide suboptimal levels of both.
The probability of an adverse medical event is a function of allocation decisions
based on expected patient needs and the specific efforts that hospitals use to prevent633 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
errors. Identified unfortunate outcomes are the realization from the probability func-
tion.
The role of regulation is to provide incentives for higher levels of effort to produce
quality. The federal government is the largest payer of health care. In order to receive
payments from the federal government, hospitals must meet a list of specific effort
requirements. These requirements include the minimum acceptable levels of excess
capacity (or reserve margins) and the performance of certain types of initiatives. A
broad set of requirements focus on systems that hospitals must have in place to iden-
tify, evaluate, and prevent medical error.
The effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism is determined by how well it moti-
vates risk probability to the patient. A reduced risk will be realized with fewer unfa-
vorable outcomes. The model of regulation is a two-player principal-agent game with
asymmetric information. The agent (hospital) owns a means of production but needs
the permission of the principal (CMS/JCAHO). Each player is only interested in his
or her own payoff.
The principal’s objective is observed as the minimization of a realizable loss asso-
ciated with quality. For the agent to operate, it must agree to a contract with the
principal. The contract will specify the duties and payoffs to both players. The princi-
pal is not able to costlessly verify that the agent is complying with the contract, so the
principal commits to an inspection strategy to monitor agent effort. Monitoring is
expensive so the principal wants to minimize that cost.
The principal wants the agent to accept the contract, so it has to be both
individually rational and incentive-compatible. Individual rationality suggests
that the requirements on the agent cannot be so intense that the agent would be
better off not accepting the contract and shutting down. The contract is incen-
tive-compatible if the agent can make itself better off by complying with the
terms of the contract. Both individual rationality and incentive compatibility
are constraints on the principal’s objective function.
The strategy options for the principal are specified in the contract. The principal
maintains control of (1) the standards and requirements that the agent must adhere
to, (2) the probability of an inspection occurring, and (3) the payoff to the agent for
both compliance and non-compliance.  During an inspection, the principal collects
information on how well the agent complies with the standards. This information
should be valuable by two considerations: the information provides a signal of effort
(and therefore quality) by the agent and it provides an incentive to increase effort to
comply with the standards. A higher probability of inspection should correspond to a
greater incentive to comply. The same is true for payoff: the higher the reward for
compliance and penalty for non-compliance, the greater the incentive.
HYPOTHESES
A regulatory strategy may be ineffective for two reasons. The first is because
agents do not comply with the standards defined in the contract. The standards would
work to promote quality if they were followed, but the principal’s strategy does not
provide enough incentive to comply. The second reason is because performance stan-634 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
dards are not correlated with their objective or that the correlation is too weak to
have a recognizable effect. Compliance may be high in this case, but with no value.
There are numerous reasons why JCAHO’s oversight strategy may be ineffec-
tive. The primary reason is the dual role of JCAHO as a regulator and advocate.
Being comprised of the American Hospital Association, the American Medical Associa-
tion, and the health care insurance industry leaves JCAHO with a conflict of interest.
The CMS’ maximization objective would evaluate the rationality constraint at the point
of indifference between accepting and rejecting the contract. JCAHO would evaluate
the constraint as an inequality (hospitals strictly preferring to accept). In other words,
JCAHO is motivated by hospitals’ success beyond just the quality of care provided.
While the CMS oversees JCAHO to assure that inspections are at least as rigor-
ous as what CMS would perform, only the means of inspection are evaluated and not
the ends. To the CMS, it is acceptable for the means of JCAHO inspections to be more
demanding than a CMS inspection. Patient care specific performance areas that are
as rigorous as CMS standards may be “good enough.” JCAHO may have additional
standards on managerial and administrative function directed at efficiency and/or
profitability. These additional standards may diminish the effect of the patient care
standards.
 The first question to be asked is whether JCAHO inspections have any identifi-
able effect on patient outcomes. Specifically, do JCAHO inspection variables explain
enough of the variation that they significantly improve the explanatory power of a
model predicting in-hospital mortality?
HYPOTHESIS 1. The JCAHO performance variables are jointly significant in
explaining patient mortality.
A specific area of interest is whether better performance scores signal better hos-
pital quality. The JCAHO survey can act as a signal of process quality and/or a means
to induce better processes of care. Either of these roles provides value. The number of
deaths may fall as a hospital approaches an inspection due to an inducement effect.
The impact of survey scores after controlling for time until inspection provides evi-
dence of the value of the survey information on hospital quality.
HYPOTHESIS 2. JCAHO performance scores are signals of hospital quality.
JCAHO surveys are performed every three years. Hospitals have historically
known approximately when the JCAHO inspection team was due to arrive. One to
two months in advance, the hospital was informed as the inspection’s start date. The
probability of inspection therefore is 1 for the scheduled year and 0 for the other two
years. Knowing that there will not be a potential penalty in the “off” years reduces
the incentive to comply with the contract. Hospitals start preparing for an inspection
up to a year in advance, updating equipment, training staff, and holding mock in-
spections. The amount of preparation may result in improved quality of the care by
the hospital in the short-period leading up to an inspection. The same is true for the
period shortly following an inspection, as quality benefits may have duration before
they expire and because many hospitals have re-inspections. The value of survey
information becomes less valuable the longer it is from an inspection.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Part of the variation in hospital deaths is explained by the
duration to or from the JCAHO inspection.635 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
Finally, because hospitals receive a Full Survey score on a scale of 0 to 100, there
is a natural tendency to use a survey as a report card on hospitals. The use of the
survey report as a consumer tool would increase the incentive to comply with perfor-
mance standards.
HYPOTHESIS 4. The JCAHO Survey report acts as a comparative report on hos-
pitals.
THE MODELING APPROACH
The econometric model evaluates the relationship between the count of occur-
rences for some event and a vector of covariates that includes inspection variables.
Count models explain variation in the count of incidents by variation in the unit of
observation and regulation variables. The Poisson distribution will be used to esti-
mate the effects of the inspection variables on patient deaths. The mean count, l, is
an intensity parameter that varies depending on a vector of independent, exogenous
covariates (xi).
The Poisson model is an effective and popular method to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. The problem of temporal dependence will present as unobserved het-
erogeneity in cross-sectional data [Cameron and Trivedi, 1998]. In panel data, the
heterogeneity associated with error that correlates across time can be captured using
a random effects model.
The use of the random effects panel Poisson is similar to the Negative Binomial
model in that it allows for over dispersion in the data. The differences are that the
Poisson specification used here assumes that the source of heterogeneity is the hospi-
tal, this heterogeneity can be modeled through repeated observation, and the error is
normally distributed. The source of the heterogeneity in the Negative Binomial model
is unknown, but assumed to be distributed gamma.
DATA
Samples on the count of in-hospital deaths per calendar quarter were drawn from
453 hospitals between the years 1995 through 1997. The source for the data was the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project’s (HCUP) Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS)
[AHRQ HCUP NIS]. The complete NIS sample is yearly observations on 6 to 7 mil-
lion individual admissions in 900 to 1,000 hospitals that form a 20% percent sample
of the inpatient stays in the U.S. A sample of 5,409 observations was extracted for
patients who were classified under medical diagnosis category MDC 1, and 5,401
observations for MDC 4 patients.4 These two MDCs were chosen because they both
have mortality rates in excess of 5 percent of the total discharges in the MDC and
both have more than 5 percent of the total discharges from all MDCs. Other MDCs
have higher mortality rates but have lower prevalence of admission. A hospital was
included in this sample if it appeared in the NIS in all three years. Patient character-
istics were combined with hospital-specific variables from the NIS database. The
regulation variables were extracted from JCAHO’s Quality CheckTM website. The NIS
data was linked to the JCAHO data based on the name and address of hospitals.636 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The dependent variable used is the quarterly count of deaths that occurred for
inpatient stays. Deaths in the two MDCs were assumed to be independent. For MDC
1, the mean number of deaths was 6.6. The maximum number of deaths that a hospi-
tal experienced in a single quarter was 71. The average number of discharges that
this sample of hospitals experienced for MDC 1 patients was 132.3. For MDC 4, the
mean number of deaths was 14.5. The maximum number of deaths was 105 and the
mean discharges for the MDC was 216.3.
FIGURE 1
Count of Hospitals and Deaths per Quarter (MDC 1)
FIGURE 2
Count of Hospitals and Deaths per Quarter (MDC 4)
Table 1 contains definitions of all the explanatory variables and descriptive sta-
tistics. The independent variables in the model are grouped into three categories:
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TABLE 1
Data Description and Statistics for JCAHO Poisson/Negative Binomial Model
Variable Description Mean (S.D.) by MDC
MDC 1 MDC 4
Died Count of the number of patients that were discharged 6.647 14.490
dead per quarter per MDC (7.797) (13.504)
Ln(discharge) Natural log of discharges in MDC 4.314 4.980
(1.211) (1.017)
Age 0-15 Ratio of patients discharged aged 0 to 15. 0.049 0.116
(0.087) (0.129)
Age 16-35 Ratio of patients discharged aged 16 to 35. 0.081 0.067
(0.069) (0.049)
Age 36-50 Ratio of patients discharged aged 36 to 50. 0.111 0.100
(0.074) (0.056)
Age 51-65 Ratio of patients discharged aged 51 to 65. 0.163 0.167
(0.077) (0.060)
Age 66-80 Ratio of patients discharged aged 66 to 80. 0.363 0.343
(0.118) (0.104)
Age 81+ Ratio of patients discharged aged 81+. 0.233 0.207
(0.126) (0.097)
White Ratio of patients discharged with race identified as “white”. 0.810 0.807
(0.214) (0.215)
Female Ratio of female patients discharged. 0.530 0.521
(0.104) (0.073)
Male Ratio of male patients discharged. 0.470 0.479
(0.104) (0.073)
Diagnoses The natural log of the average number of 1.863 1.850
diagnoses coded on patients’ records. (0.190) (0.199)
Brain cancer Percent of patients with principal classification code 35. 0.0102 -
(0.0231) -
Secondary Percent of patients with principal .0.0163 0.0174
 malignancies classification code 42 (0.3120) (0.0242)
Acute cerebro- Percent of patients with principal 0.3120 -
 vascular disease  classification code 109. (0.1805) -
Intracranial Percent of patients with principal classification code 233. 0.0540 -
 injury (0.0649) -
Respiratory Percent of patients with principal classification code 131. - 0.0542
 failure - (0.0483)
Aspiration Percent of patients with principal classification code 129. - 0.0475
 pneumonitis - (0.0420)
Lung Cancer Percent of patients with principal classification code 19. - 0.0433
- (0.0433)
Other Facility Ratio of discharges that were admitted from another 0.070 0.066
medical facility. (0.145) (0.141)
Income 0-25 Ratio of discharges where median income from zip 0.346 0.356
code of residence is between $0 - $25,000. (0.342) (0.344)
Income 25-30 Ratio of discharges where median income from zip 0.235 0.238
code of residence is between $25,001 - $30,000. (0.242) (0.241)
Income 30-35 Ratio of discharges where median income from zip 0.156 0.153
code of residence is between $30,001 - $35,000. (0.188) (0.184)
Income 35+ Ratio of discharges where median income from zip 0.263 0.253
code of residence is between $35,001 + (0.311) (0.310)
Specialize Discharges in MDC divided by total discharges 0.062 0.116
 from the hospital. (0.052) (0.055)638 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Data Description and Statistics for JCAHO Poisson/Negative Binomial Model
Variable Description Mean (S.D.) by MDC
MDC 1 MDC 4
Surgical Ratio of discharges that had a surgery or a surgical consult. 0.250 0.205
(0.313) (0.264)
Government Dummy variable. 1 = ownership of the hospital 0.131 0.131
 Owned is the government (non-federal). (0.337) (0.338)
Not-for-profit Dummy variable. 1 = hospital designated as a 0.733 0.732
not-for-profit corporation. (0.442) (0.443)
Investor Owned Dummy variable. 1 = hospital designated as a 0.136 0.137
not-for-profit corporation. (0.343) (0.344)
Rural Dummy variable. 1 = rural hospital. 0.288 0.289
(0.453) (0.453)
Urban Dummy variable. 1 = urban hospital. 0.712 0.711
(0.453) (0.453)
Teaching Dummy variable. 1 = teaching hospital. 0.189 0.189
(0.392) (0.392)
Time before/ The natural log of the duration in 1.073 1.073
 after inspection years since the full survey listed. (0.282) (0.282)
(Time before/ Time squared. 1.230 1.231
after inspection)2 (0.469) (0.469)
Administration Count of administration and planning violations 5.351 5.338
(see Table 2) divided by 10 (3.407) (3.402)
Management Count of management violations (see Table 2) 2.383 2.379
divided by 10. (2.455) (2.455)
Patient Care Count of patient care violations (see Table 2) 7.256 7.257
divided by 10. (4.305) (4.308)
The number of patients that arrive at each hospital and the health problems
associated with those patients are the state of nature that reveals itself to the hospi-
tal. As a hospital treats more patients, it naturally experiences a greater count of
deaths. Patients arrive with different stocks of health capital. While health capital is
not directly observable, it may be correlated with identifiable characteristics such as
age, race, gender, and income. Age is the most unambiguous variable correlated to
health. Over time health capital depreciates. The rate of depreciation is likely to
increase as age increases.
The patient characteristics were very similar for both of the MDCs. The single
largest age group for patients in each of the MDCs was 66 to 80 years old. Patients
identified as white, non-Hispanic constituted over 80 percent of the patients for each
category. The proportion of female and male patients was evenly split. The income
profiles are parallel. Two other characteristics that were recorded that explain the
admission level of health for patients is the number of diagnoses recorded for the
patient and whether the patient was admitted from another medical facility. The
number of diagnoses indicates patient comorbidities that complicate the effective-
ness of medical treatment. A patient from another medical facility has received some
care prior to arrival at the hospital and would not likely have been transported to the
observed hospital unless it increased the probability of saving the patient. The aver-639 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
age number of diagnoses per patient was about 6.5 for each MDC. Approximately 7
percent of the admissions came from other medical facilities.
Hospital characteristics are used to control for potential patient selection prob-
lems in the data. The hospital characteristics that are used include the degree of
specialization in the MDC, the proportion of patients that received a surgical consul-
tation, the ownership of the hospital (government-owned, not-for-profit, or for-profit),
whether the hospital is rural or urban, and whether it is a teaching hospital. A hospi-
tal that specializes in a limited number of diseases and disorders is expected to be
better at treating its patients’ conditions than a general hospital. This creates a po-
tential selection problem regarding the hospital that a patient would choose. The
most critical patients would likely be sent to the most specialized hospitals. The pro-
portion of patients receiving a surgical consultation could be classified as a patient-
level or a hospital-level variable. It is listed as hospital-level here because the algo-
rithms of care that are adopted by individual hospitals heavily influence the propor-
tion of consultations.
Investor-owned, for-profit hospitals have a strong adverse selection incentive.
This ownership type may experience fewer deaths based on patient selection rather
than quality of care. Rural hospitals have a slightly different function than urban
hospitals. When a critically ill patient arrives at a rural hospital, often the goal of the
hospital is to treat for life-threatening conditions and then prepare the patient to be
transported to a larger urban hospital.
Teaching status of a hospital is important. A teaching hospital, while trying to
improve the health of patients, is also trying to train doctors. Because of these dual
objectives, the hospital is likely to actively pursue the most critical patients and may
intensively treat patients that have little or no hope of improvement.
Deviation occurs in the hospital-level data. ‘Specialize’ is the number of discharges
in the MDC divided by the total discharges from the hospital. The variable serves as
an indicator of specialization by the hospital in the identified diseases and disorders.
On average, there is a stronger specialization in circulatory problems such as cardiac
care than respiratory problems (e.g., emphysema and COPD) and more in respira-
tory care than problems with the nervous system (e.g., brain surgery and neurology).
Approximately one-fourth of the admissions in MDC 1 and about one-fifth of the
patients in MDC 4 had some contact with a surgeon. 73 percent of the hospitals in
this sample were private, not-for-profit hospitals. The remaining hospitals were split
between government owned and for-profit hospitals. The NIS excludes federal hospi-
tals, so the government hospitals include state and local government-owned hospi-
tals. 71 percent of the hospitals were urban, and approximately 19 percent of the care
centers were registered as teaching hospitals.
Table 2 presents the performance areas from the JCAHO Full Survey and the
corresponding group that is analyzed in this study.
Each performance measure is the deviation in actual score from the best possible
score. Each performance area is scored from 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest level of
compliance to JCAHO standards. The measure is a sum of the actual scores minus
one from each of the performance areas that comprise each of the performance640 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 2
The JCAHO Survey Variable Groups.
Performance Area Performance Area Group
Accreditation Participation Requirements Administration
Anesthesia Care Patient Care
Assessing Staff Competence Management
Assessment of Data Administration
Availability of Patient-Specific Information Administration
Continuity of Care Patient Care
Credentialing Administration
Data Collection and Analysis Administration
Departmental Leadership Management
Design of New Services Administration
Design of the Environment Administration
Governance Management
Human Resources Planning Administration
Implementation of Safety Plans Patient Care
Improvement of Performance Administration
Improvement Planning Administration
Infection Control Patient Care
Information Management Planning Administration
Initial Assessment Procedures Patient Care
Integrating and Coordinating Services Management
Leaders’ Role in Improving Performance Management
Literature to Support Decision Making Management
Management Management
Managing Staff Requests Management
Measurement of Processes and Outcomes Management
Medication Use Patient Care
Monitoring Safety Plans Management
Needs Assessment for Specific Patient Populations Patient Care
Nursing Patient Care
Nutrition Care Patient Care
Operative Procedures Patient Care
Organization Ethics Administration
Organization, Bylaws, Rules, and Regulations Administration
Orienting, Training, and Educating Staff Management
Pathology and Clinical Laboratory Services Patient Care
Patient and Family Education Patient Care
Patient Rights Patient Care
Planning and Providing Care Patient Care
Processes for Patient Care Decisions Patient Care
Reassessment Procedures Patient Care
Rehabilitation Care Patient Care
Relevant Policies Administration
Social Environment Administration
Special Treatment Procedures Patient Care
Strategic Planning Administration
Use of Comparative Information Administration
measures. Performance areas that are classified as management areas had the few-
est number of deficiencies with a mean of 2.4. Surveys on average resulted in 5.3641 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
administrative deficiencies, and 7.3 for patient care. The patient care group has the
most deficiencies per performance area of the three categories. The average time
since inspection is approximately 2 years at the patient level (discharge date to in-
spection date) and 18 months at the hospital level (inspection date to midpoint of
calendar quarter).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 reports the results of the random-effect panel Poisson model for diseases
and disorders of the nervous system (MDC 1). Table 4 contains the results for dis-
eases and disorders of the respiratory system (MDC 4). Model 1 is the full model with
patient-level, hospital-level, and inspection variables all included. Model 2 contains
the patient- and hospital-specific variables, but none of the inspection variables. Model
3 adds the Time variable into Model 2, but not the compliance indicators (Adminis-
tration, Management, and Patient Care). Model 4 adds the indicators to Model 2, but
not Time. Model 5 only contains the intercept, the compliance indicators and the
random-effects parameter.
The primary use of the patient-level data is to control for the health expectations
or state of nature in which hospitals operate. While there are many variables that
are unobservable in the data, such as patient obesity or smoking propensity, the
control function of the available data is quite good. The number of discharges in the
TABLE 3
Random-Effects, Panel Poisson Model for Diseases and Disorders of the
Nervous System (MDC 1). Dependent variable is “Count of Deaths.” (n = 5,409)a
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept -2.769 *** -2.963 *** -2.485 *** -2.318 *** 1.645 ***
(-12.780) (-13.855) (-12.254) (-11.114) (20.487)
Ln(discharge) 1.079  *** 1.081 *** 1.082  *** 1.082  *** -
(167.887) (166.662) (165.714) (167.658)
Age 0-15 -0.346 * 0.191 -0.045 -0.003 -
(-1.922) (0.724) (-0.300) (-0.019)
Age 16-35 0.655 *** 0.529 *** 0.308 * 0.418 * -
(2.409) (2.039) (1.231) (1.691)
Age 36-50 0.179 0.036 -0.023 0.095 -
(0.754) (0.109) (-0.139) (0.368)
Age 66-80 0.582 *** 0.798 *** 0.637 *** 0.648 *** -
(3.491) (4.661) (4.458 (4.432)
Age 81+ 0.970 *** 1.097 *** 1.016 *** 0.956 *** -
(5.059) (5.885) (6.640) (5.980)
White -0.206 *** 0.246 *** 0.098 ** 0.088 * -
(-4.289) (4.845) (2.002) (1.859)
Female -0.201 * -0.286 ** -0.261 *** -0.238 * -
(-1.850) (-2.532) (-2.323) (-1.834)
Diagnoses 0.195 *** 0.059 0.001 0.055 -
(3.493) (1.118) (0.012) (0.776)
Brain cancer -0.680 0.079 -0.161 -0.558 -
(-1.326) (0.120) (-0.341) (-0.969)642 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 3 (cont.)
Random-Effects, Panel Poisson Model for Diseases and Disorders of the
Nervous System (MDC 1). Dependent variable is “Count of Deaths.” (n = 5,409)a
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Secondary 0.599 * 0.728 *** 0.564 0.644 * -
 malignancies (1.874) (2.179) (1.531) (1.818)
Acute cerebro- 0.211 *** 0.362 *** 0.243 *** 0.333 *** -
 vascular disease (3.059) (5.566) (3.456) (4.797)
Intracranial injury -0.059 -0.114 -0.216 -0.025 -
(-0.395) (-0.777) (1.358) (-0.159)
Other Facility 0.095 -0.088 -0.275 *** 0.221 -
(0.830) (-0.341) (-2.123) (-1.305)
Income 0-25 0.092 -0.108 * -0.060 -0.118 *** -
(1.560) (-1.784) (-1.463) (-2.222)
Income 25-30 -0.165 *** -0.088 -0.234 *** -0.285 *** -
(-3.167) (-1.263) (-4.208) (-3.426)
Income 30-35 -0.087 -0.069 -0.094 -0.080 -
(-1.588) (-1.113) (-1.347) (-0.970)
Specialize -1.630 *** -2.273 *** -1.669 *** -1.753 *** -
(-2.821) (-4.390) (-2.961) (-2.590)
Attendings 1.043 *** 1.034 *** 1.030 *** 0.970 *** -
(49.255) (50.012) (59.299) (42.615)
Surgical -0.032 -0.074 ** 0.039 0.077 *** -
(-1.130) (2.019) (1.142) (2.607)
Government Owned 0.286 *** 0.293 *** 0.091 ** 0.443 *** -
(4.772) (5.393) (2.022) (7.002)
Not-for-profit 0.213 *** 0.293 *** 0.098 *** 0.113 *** -
(3.854) (6.389) (2.362) (2.065)
Rural -0.083 * -0.028 0.001 -0.135 *** -
(-1.906) (-0.741) (0.034) (-3.7287)
Teaching 0.163 *** 0.092 *** 0.105 *** 0.111 *** -
(7.471) (3.562) (4.445) (5.191)
Time before/ -0.068 *** - -0.064 * - -0.074
 after inspection (-2.063) (-1.879) (-1.476)
(Time before/ 0.028 *** - 0.021 *** - 0.024 ***
 after inspection)2 (4.237) (3.087) (2.169)
Administration -0.023 *** - - -0.043 *** -0.114 ***
(-7.729) (-9.447) (-14.850)
Management -0.006 - - 0.017 *** -0.103 ***
(-1.488) (3.525) (-9.328)
Patient Care 0.004 * - - 0.006 *** 0.069 ***
(1.891) (2.210) (11.076)
σu (random-effects 0.489 *** 0.440 *** 0.459 *** 0.477 *** 0.777 ***
 parameter) (35.471) (33.606) (43.369) (25.339) (38.985)
Log-likelihood -11479.953 -11480.332 -11474.761 -11502.076 -12395.589
Maddala’s R2 0.317 0.317 0.318 0.311 0.041
Akaike’s infor- 23017.907 23018.664 23007.522 23062.152 24849.178
 mation criterion
aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics (based on heteroscedastic-consistent variance-covariance matrix);
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively (based on a two-tailed test).643 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
TABLE 4
Random-Effects, Panel Poisson Model for Diseases and Disorders of the Res-
piratory System(MDC 4). Dependent variable is “Count of Deaths.” (n = 5,401)a
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept -1.498 *** -2.397 *** -2.473 -2.101 *** 2.486 ***
(-4.344) (-12.581) (-0.204) (-10.756) (51.197)
Ln(discharge) 1.097 *** 1.082 *** 1.091 *** 1.095 ***
(0.008)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age 0-15 0.113 -0.081 -0.035 -0.070 -
(0.379) (-0.460) (-0.002) (-0.454)
Age 16-35 0.038 0.372 0.088 ** 0.184 -
(0.038) (1.526) (0.030) (0.613)
Age 36-50 -0.0.35 -0.205 -0.063 -0.148 -
(-0.196) (-0.909) (-0.002) (-0.639)
Age 66-80 0.848 ** 0.610 *** 0.725 0.649 *** -
(2.159) (3.131) (0.051) (3.626)
Age 81+ 1.419 *** 1.036 *** 1.117 0.887 *** -
(3.676) (5.674) (0.097) (5.283)
White -0.108 ** 0.134 *** -0.108 -0.078 -
(-2.093) (2.846) (-0.245) (-1.371)
Female -0.048 -0.138 -0.055 0.103 -
(-0.294) (-1.101) (-0.033) (0.846)
Diagnoses 0.158 *** 0.357 *** 0.390 *** 0.239 *** -
(3.743) (5.844) (6.299) (4.772)
Respiratory failure 1.573 *** 0.773 *** 1.349 1.208 *** -
(9.199) (2.651) (0.933) (7.536)
Aspiration 0.953 *** 0.143 0.681 0.756 *** -
 pneumonitis (3.935) (0.681) (0.193) (4.200)
Secondary 1.507 *** 0.978 *** 0.865 1.201 *** -
 malignancies (5.916) (3.234) (0.289) (3.587)
Lung Cancer 1.034 *** 0.965 *** 0.815 *** 0.978 *** -
(3.724) (4.087) (0.166) (4.631)
Other Facility -0.448 *** -0.416 *** -0.519 -0.428 *** -
(-5.098) (-5.780) (-0.949) (-6.246)
Income 0-25 -0.463 *** 0.174 0.004 -0.028 -
(-11.663) (3.564) (0.004) (-0.717)
Income 25-30 -0.355 *** -0.076 0.073 -0.169 *** -
(-7.771) (-1.414) (0.091) (-3.450)
Income 30-35 -0.266 *** -0.017 -0.026 -0.189 *** -
(-5.412) (-0.228) (-0.025) (-2.537)
Specialize 4.148 *** 3.513 *** 3.839 *** 3.539 *** -
(18.221) (14.774) (17.860) (15.852)
Attendings 0.804 *** 0.882 *** 0.840 *** 0.860 *** -
(60.267) (61.761) (3.804) (64.912)
Surgical -0.110 ** -0.029 -0.005 ** -0.031 -
(-3.646) (-1.109) (-0.006) (-1.084)
Government Owned 0.061 -0.136 *** 0.099 0.164 *** -
(1.525) (-3.599) (0.428) (4.372)
Not-for-profit 0.032 0.055 *** 0.164 0.098 *** -
(1.378) (2.471) (0.739) (3.250)
Rural -0.378 *** -0.221 *** -0.267 -0.383 *** -
(-9.706) (-5.769) (-0.895) (-10.397)
Teaching 0.021 0.232 *** 0.124 *** 0.092 *** -
(0.991) (9.723) (3.541) (5.143)644 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 4 (cont.)
Random-Effects, Panel Poisson Model for Diseases and Disorders of the Res-
piratory System(MDC 4). Dependent variable is “Count of Deaths.” (n = 5,401)a
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Time before/ -0.062 *** - -0.066 - -0.037
after inspection (-2.319) - (-0.262) - (-1.201)
Time before/ 0.022 *** - 0.025 - 0.010
after inspection)2 (3.823) (0.572) (1.532)
Administration -0.014 *** - - -0.013 *** -0.031 ***
(-4.188) - - (-4.229) (-5.159)
Management -0.015 *** - - 0.011 *** -0.074 ***
(-2.986) - - (3.157) (-11.376)
Patient Care 0.005 * - - 0.022 *** 0.010 ***
(1.958) - - (6.302) (3.365)
σu (random-effects 0.422 *** 0.401 *** 0.354 *** 0.391 *** 0.626 ***
 parameter) (40.103) (19.215) (4.298) (26.611) (41.066)
Log-likelihood -14630.931 -14685.751 -14625.476 -14662.203 -16255.552
Maddala’s R2 0.479 0.468 0.480 0.473 0.049
Akaike’s infor- 29319.862 29419.502 29302.952 29378.405 3252.103
mation criterion
aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics (based on heteroscedastic-consistent variance-covariance matrix);
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively (based on a two-tailed test).
MDC is a significant control for the number of deaths. Age is an important factor
after the age of 65 for both nervous and respiratory system conditions. For nervous
system problems, the presence of young patients is also an important consideration.
Race is statistically significant for both diagnosis categories, but the direction of cor-
relation is not consistent. To control for severity of patient illness, the proportion of
patients admitted with the diagnoses with the highest associations with mortality
are used as explanatory variables. The identification of these diagnoses is from the
Clinical Classification System [HCUP CCS] codes of the primary diagnoses. For res-
piratory patients, these conditions are respiratory failure, aspiration pneumonitis,
secondary malignancies, and lung cancer. For nervous system patient, the conditions
are brain cancer, secondary malignancies, acute cerebrovascular disease, and intrac-
ranial injury. The number of diagnoses that a patient is admitted for is important
and has an anticipated positive sign for both MDCs. This variable is used to control
for the presence of comorbities that exist in the patient populations.
The variable Other Facility is an important control variable because a patient
with a serious medical problem may originally have been admitted to a small rural
hospital which did not have the equipment or specialty to treat the patient effec-
tively. The rural hospital’s role is to stabilize the patient and prepare him for trans-
port to a larger urban hospital. The covariate in this case captures the experience of
the urban hospital.
The variable Surgical acts as both a patient characteristic, given that some pa-
tients require a surgical and medical intervention, and a hospital characteristic, since
it is a decision rule to provide surgical consultation to patients.
Both government-owned and not-for-profit hospitals have worse outcomes than
investor-owned hospitals, which may reflect patient selection by the hospitals. Inves-645 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
tor-owned hospitals treat fewer low-income patients. If we assume that higher in-
come individuals can afford greater access to elective medical care, then this could
result in investor-owned hospitals treating patients who have better admission lev-
els of health and that investor-owned hospitals can plan better for patient needs
because they know their population more thoroughly. Rural hospitals have fewer
deaths because they have fewer patients and because they transport their sickest
patients to urban hospitals. Teaching hospitals actively attract patients who are in
poorer health than do non-teaching hospitals and may aggressively treat patients
that have severe conditions where a non-teaching facility would advise non-treat-
ment.
Table 5 contains a summary of hypotheses 1 through 3. Hypothesis 1 is tested by
comparing model 1 to model 2. Mortality is better explained using the JCAHO vari-
ables for MDC 4. There is support for Hypothesis 1 that inspection activity has an
effect on patient mortality. However, the direction of this effect is not necessarily
evident. Comparing models 1 and 3 tests hypothesis 2. The JCAHO performance
areas (patient care, management, and administration) jointly explain the quality
related patient outcomes. Comparing models 1 and 4 tests hypothesis 3. The timing
to the next inspection or since the last inspection has a significant effect on mortality
for both MDC 1 and 4.
TABLE 5
Chi-Square Statistics for Hypothesis Tests Using Model 1
as the Unrestricted Model
Hypothesis Null Restrictions MDC 1 MDC4 Result
χ2 χ2
Hypothesis 1  Time, (Time)2, Administration, 0.8 109.6 ** Could not reject null for MDC 1.
Management, Patient Care Null rejected for MDC 4.
Hypothesis 2  Administration, Management, 10.4 * 10.9 * Null rejected
Patient Care
Hypothesis 3  Time before/after inspection, 44.2 ** 62.5 ** Null rejected
( Time before/after inspection)2
*Significant at the 0.05 level;  **significant at the 0.01 level.
Hypothesis 4 tests whether the JCAHO survey can be used as a comparative
report on hospitals. The information from the Full Survey is modestly informative of
the quality of care delivered by hospitals. The Full Survey score, however, has the
problem that the overall score aggregates the results from all three performance
area groups. This implies that basing a decision on the overall score could lead to
poor decision-making. The score does not suggest the nature of the non-compliance.
 Time before/after inspection captures the preparation by hospitals for the JCAHO
inspection team. As an inspection is approaching, hospitals become more compliant
with standards. There is a benefit to this compliance. The benefit begins to diminish
after the survey is over. The Time variable can be used to evaluate the optimal tim-
ing of inspections to minimize patient demise.
An increase in the Administration, Management, or Patient Care indicator means
that the hospital is less compliant with the associated performance standard. Patient646 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Care is statistically significant for both MDCs and the sign is positive. A better Pa-
tient Care score is correlated with better patient outcomes. Administration and Man-
agement indicators results are the opposite. Patients do not apparently benefit from
an improvement in Administration or Management indicators with respect to mor-
tality. This finding on the JCAHO inspection variables is robust across the two MDCs
and strongly supports the idea that JCAHO’s various roles result in conflicting qual-
ity incentives.
The standardized (beta) coefficients for Administration, Management, and Pa-
tient Care variables for MDC 1 are -0.015, -0.016, and 0.018 respectively; for MDC 4,
the betas are -0.015, -0.019, and 0.026. This suggests that the Patient Care indicator
has the greatest explanatory power for hospital deaths. A one standard deviation
improvement in Patient Care performance area scores results in a 0.018 standard
deviation improvement in patient deaths for nervous system diseases and disorders
and a 0.026 standard deviation improvement for respiratory conditions.
In conclusion, JCAHO surveys do provide an incentive to hospitals to improve
processes of care for the period leading up to an inspection and that incentive gets
eliminated after the inspection occurs. JCAHO has announced a change from the
scheduled survey to an unannounced strategy. The objective of this change is to pro-
vide an incentive to maintain a level of readiness. This may not occur if hospitals are
motivated to minimize the overall cost of JCAHO compliance. Currently, hospitals
are induced to prepare heavily for the Full Survey to minimize the cost of a follow-up
inspection. It is likely that the change to the unannounced survey may reduce the
preparedness of hospitals so that the expense is to fix performance areas that are
identified by the full inspection.
The full survey scores do not identify whether hospitals are high or low quality
largely because the different performance areas tend to counter each other. An im-
provement in performance areas that focus on patient care does work to improve pa-
tient outcomes across MDC 1 and MDC 4. Administrative and Management perfor-
mance area improvements may actually result in worse patient outcomes. A policy
opportunity is to change the focus of the Medicare compliance decision to rely only on
quality indicators that relate to patient care. This change would separate JCAHO’s
quality assurance from its consulting activities. There is indication that society is bet-
ter off with the JCAHO accreditation process than without it given that the patient
care indicators have the largest effect on patient outcomes of the three areas identified.
NOTES
1 New Jersey and Oklahoma do not accept JCAHO hospital accreditation as compliance with state
certification requirements for hospitals. It is interesting that all 50 states do recognize JCAHO’s be-
havioral health accreditation program.
2 The OIG report (OEI-01-97-00053) did recognize that JCAHO inspections foster “attention to continu-
ous quality improvement.”
3 There are some hospitals that are surveyed by both JCAHO and AOA.
4 MDC 1 is nervous system diseases and disorders and MDC 4 is illness of the respiratory system.647 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
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